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Seventy Years of the Smith-Mundt Act and U.S. International 
Broadcasting: Back to the Future?
Emily T. Metzgar*
Indiana University
May I say that I sometimes wonder if the rest of the 
world is as eager to hear the American story as we 
think it is?
    John S. Knight
Abstract
The United States has engaged in peacetime international 
broadcasting and related activities since passage of the Smith-
Mundt Act in 1948.2 Formally known as the U.S. Information 
and Educational Exchange Act, Smith-Mundt is the statutory 
foundation for the U.S. government’s transparent production 
and dissemination of news and information intended for 
foreign audiences. The political rationale for American 
engagement in these activities, the legislative structure 
authorizing them and the environment—both international 
and domestic—within which these activities unfold have 
evolved in the seven decades since Congress first deemed 
“telling America’s story to the world” a worthwhile endeavor. 
This paper for the CPD Perspectives series discusses the 
legislative actions, the rhetoric and the context for U.S. 
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international broadcasting (USIB) at key junctures since the 
end of World War II. The pattern that emerges is one of both 
continuity and disconnect, from a consistently stated desire to 
promote democracy and freedom of information to variable 
views about how to manage the broadcasters and navigate 
a changing international system. The analysis presented 
here has particular relevance for the contemporary political 
environment where concerns about the efficacy of U.S. 
government-sponsored broadcasting and other messaging 
activities abroad have driven legislative change while raising 
new worries about the potential for government messaging 
tools to be turned on American audiences at home.
Discussion begins with the deliberations that led to 
passage of Smith-Mundt then moves to an evaluation of 
amendments intended to curtail domestic access to USIB 
content, continues with a discussion of post-Cold War 
legislation that dramatically altered the bureaucratic structure 
responsible for overseeing international broadcasting, 
and finally arrives at recent actions undertaken to impose 
increased accountability on the broadcasters and to relax 
constraints on domestic access to their content. In addressing 
these issues, this report connects past to present, offering a 
framework for current discussions about U.S. international 
broadcasting and related information diplomacy efforts in 
the contemporary global communication ecosystem.
This report does not purport to be a thorough retelling 
of the history of the Smith-Mundt Act’s passage in early 
1948, nor of amendments or other legislation that came 
later. Rather, the work presented here seeks to offer a 
modest overview of the legislation that has governed U.S. 
international broadcasting, as well as public discussion 
about it, since the end of World War II.
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Past as Prologue?
It was a time of growing geopolitical instability with 
the Russian menace on the rise. Politicians in Washington 
worried that nefarious actors across the globe were spreading 
disinformation about the United States. Even worse, they 
were concerned that foreign agents had corrupted key 
democratic institutions in the American homeland. While 
this scenario is reminiscent of the contemporary American 
context, it also describes the view from the United States 
seventy years ago as the world drifted into a cold war 
following World War II.
In 1943, well before the end of the war, President 
Franklin Roosevelt was thinking about how the American 
government’s wartime international broadcast efforts—
which had come to be known as the Voice of America—
could transition from a propaganda operation to peacetime 
production of news about the United States and the world.3 
Roosevelt sought to ensure that the country would continue 
spreading a message of democracy and information 
freedom well after the war’s end. He presented the rationale 
for continued engagement in broadcasting as promoting 
“better understanding between the peoples of the world” 
and insisted that even while still at war, the United States 
should tend to laying the “proper foundations” for such 
efforts to continue after hostilities came to an end.4
Two years later, on the day of Japan’s surrender, President 
Harry Truman commissioned Secretary of State James 
Byrnes to establish a permanent international information 
program as part of the United States’ new peacetime foreign 
policy.5 Similar to Roosevelt’s earlier hopes, Truman sought 
to make certain that the world would continue to hear about 
the country on its own terms. In an executive order, Truman 
specified that the government’s postwar broadcasts would 
present “a full and fair picture of American life and of the 
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aims and policies of the United States Government.”6 The 
broadcasts were not intended to function as propaganda 
but rather as a source of accurate information about the 
United States in a complicated world. In responding to the 
president’s request, Byrnes echoed Truman’s objectives, 
noting “We would defeat our objectives in this program 
if we were to engage in special propagandist pleading. 
Our purpose is, and will be, solely to supply the facts on 
which foreign people can arrive at a rational and accurate 
judgment.”7 Byrnes then set out to rally support for legislation 
that would authorize government engagement in a range of 
activities that today are described as public diplomacy.
Despite unwavering executive branch support for the 
proposed peacetime efforts to engage foreign publics, it was 
not until early 1948 that President Truman was presented with 
legislation sanctioning the government’s public diplomacy 
activities, including international broadcasting and other 
messaging efforts. The years between Truman’s request 
for action and promulgation of legislation to implement it 
brought heated debates about American engagement in 
these activities among politicians and journalists who held 
a range of views concerning the propriety of government 
involvement in the creation and international distribution 
of news. While these debates played out in public fora, the 
media did more than just report on them. Leading figures in 
American journalism took sides in the discussion, advocating 
either for or against what some saw as government’s 
ill-advised and possibly anti-competitive entry into the 
broadcast news business. The legislation that resulted was 
shaped by these debates.
In the seventy years since, Congress has modified 
the bureaucratic structure responsible for managing the 
country’s now-five broadcasters and has tinkered with 
restrictions on the domestic dissemination of their content. 
Meanwhile, American journalists, government officials 
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and pundits of all stripes have continued to weigh in on 
the subject of U.S. international broadcasting. Although 
contemporary debates have been neither as vitriolic nor as 
public as those prior to passage of Smith-Mundt, opinions 
today are no less strongly held and often no less alarmist. 
Discussion here considers key legislative actions that have 
influenced U.S. engagement in international broadcasting 
and the rhetoric that has surrounded these actions over the 
last seven decades. The picture that emerges recalls the 
French epigram, “Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose” 
(“The more things change, the more they stay the same”).
The story begins with efforts to craft the U.S. Information 
and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, popularly referred 
to as the Smith-Mundt Act.8 The statute’s description 
declares the law’s intent to “enable the Government of the 
United States to promote a better understanding of the 
United States in other countries, and to increase mutual 
understanding between the people of the United States 
and the people of other countries.” Although the mandate 
sounds straightforward, getting the bill through Congress 
was anything but.
In announcing the Department of State’s intention to 
continue international broadcasting after the end of World 
War II, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs William 
Benton declared in The New York Times that “Foreign public 
opinion about the United States may determine our future 
peace and security and the peace and security of the world.”9 
A long-time advertising executive and former owner of both 
Muzak and Encyclopedia Britannica, Benton faced an uphill 
battle in his efforts to formalize the American government’s 
program to counter the misinformation already being spread 
about the United States by the Soviet Union and others in 
the postwar era.
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Believing truth to be the best antidote to other 
countries’ targeted misinformation efforts, Benton was 
the administration’s point person in efforts to nurture 
Congressional support for legislative authorization of the 
broadcasts that had come to be known as the Voice of 
America during the war. But the changing international 
environment presented challenges and opportunities to the 
practice of journalism, and American journalists had mixed 
reactions to the U.S. government’s plans to engage in their 
industry. Benton soon found himself embroiled in a public 
exchange of views with leaders of the media establishment.
Writing in September 1945, The New York Times declared 
that the State Department was “for the first time entering 
officially the field of dissemination of information abroad.”10 
Quoted in the article, Benton insisted the effort would not 
constitute propaganda. He emphasized that “Open public 
debate—through the newspapers, the magazines, the radio 
and other forms of communication between peoples—is 
perhaps the most important development in the history of 
our diplomatic efforts abroad.”11 As envisioned by Truman, 
the peacetime international information program would 
broadcast news and government-related information and 
would be utterly transparent in the process.
But controversy surrounded the prospect of government 
engagement in the creation and distribution of news. Aside 
from the issue of whether the government should be involved 
in such activities at all, the question was how the government 
would acquire the news it intended to disseminate. During 
the war, American and British wire services—the Associated 
Press, Reuters and United Press International—had provided 
content gratis to the government which had then prepared 
global broadcasts based on that reporting. In looking toward 
the establishment of postwar broadcast operations, the U.S. 
government had assumed—wrongly, as it turned out—that 
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these news organizations would continue to make their 
content available to government broadcasters.
Attempting to circumvent concerns from a nascent 
commercial broadcast industry, Benton declared, “We in 
the State Department know that private interests are eager 
to do more than they have ever done…The government’s 
job will be merely to fill in the gaps.”12 But fallout from the 
mistaken assumption about access to sources of content 
for the broadcasts drove much of the early media coverage 
of the administration’s quest for legislation authorizing 
the department to engage in these activities. As Congress 
considered the issue, American media leaders weighed in 
against government engagement in the production and 
distribution of news. Early on, Kent Cooper, executive 
director of the Associated Press, declared his opposition 
to the government’s entry into the industry by declaring, 
“Abhorrence of the government going into the news business 
has been so ingrained into our national character that to 
legalize it is like amending the Constitution.”13 Meanwhile, 
the publisher of Knight Newspapers, John S. Knight, criticized 
the government’s idealistic rationale for engaging in such 
activities, describing the government’s assumption that its 
broadcasts could serve as a tool for democratic promotion 
worldwide as “ludicrously naïve.”14
But other voices from the industry expressed general 
support for the effort. Newsweek’s Washington bureau chief, 
Ernest Lindley, wrote, “[I]t would take a couple of columns to 
enumerate the ways in which an official American information 
service abroad would be useful. Very few, if any, of these 
activities would, or could be undertaken by private American 
entities. Their [the broadcasts’] value has been established 
beyond question during the war. By dropping them, we would 
be penalizing no one but ourselves.”15 Similar sentiment was 
evident in a State Department document authored by Harold 
Lasswell who framed the need for broadcasts in the context 
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of pursuing American foreign policy goals. Lasswell argued 
that in places where commercial media presence was not 
viable, it was appropriate for State to step in.16 Meanwhile, 
a report in The New York Times emphasized the fact that 
the effort was intended neither to compete with American 
media abroad nor to function as propaganda directed at 
foreign audiences.17
Still, tensions with the wire services nearly derailed the 
government effort altogether, as did frictions related to 
worry about the potential for government competition 
with the growing commercial broadcast industry. Indeed, 
Representative William Lemke (R-ND) accused those who 
supported the administration’s proposal of having ulterior 
motives to undermine the industry. He declared, “Behind 
the scenes of this legislation are [those] who want to put 
the United States Government into the broadcasting 
business…”18 He continued, “Here would be another instance 
of unnecessary government competition with private 
enterprise, and in a field where American private enterprise 
has been notably successful.”19
With these debates publicly brewing, the board of the 
Associated Press (AP) in 1946 voted to distance itself entirely 
from the government’s peacetime broadcasting effort, 
canceling what had been its free wartime service.20 Although 
a resolution passed by the board at that same meeting 
praised the administration’s efforts to promote global press 
freedom, the group nevertheless determined that “this 
government cannot engage in newscasting without creating 
the fear of propaganda which necessarily would reflect 
on the objectivity of the news services from which such 
newscasts are prepared.”21 As a result, not only would AP 
refrain from offering its content for free, it would not make 
the service available to the government at any price.22
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The stated rationale for AP’s decision did not sit well with 
Assistant Secretary Benton. In response to the organization’s 
much-publicized move, he mused that the board may not 
have been “fully informed about the program.”23 This only 
worsened the situation. Soon, United Press International 
joined AP in cancelling all service to the government,24 and 
Reuters was not far behind.25 The journalism community 
reacted publicly. The Christian Science Monitor’s Erwin 
Canhem, for example, supported the wire services’ actions,26 
while Nelson Poynter of the St. Petersburg Times approved 
the government effort to “fill the gaps of information which 
private agencies leave in the foreign field.”27
But Benton soon zeroed in on an inconsistency in the 
agencies’ claims that they feared being associated with 
propaganda as the rationale for refusal to provide content 
for the government’s broadcasts. He observed that they 
seemed unconcerned about the continued sale of their 
content to other countries’ state broadcasters, naming the 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), the Soviet news 
agency TASS and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
(CBC) as the groups’ current clients.28 Benton concluded 
that the argument about propaganda was a red herring and 
suggested that their real concern was the possibility of the 
American government actually competing with their news 
services in foreign markets.29
In late January 1946, Editor & Publisher published 
a “Symposium on State Department News”, presenting 
the opinions of leading journalists on the subject of 
government-sponsored broadcasting. The editor of the St. 
Paul (MN) Dispatch-Pioneer Press wrote, “The action of the 
Associated Press was over-hasty and unnecessarily reflects 
on the government’s broadcasting policy. A reconsideration 
is in order.”30 In contrast, Colonel Robert R. McCormick of 
the Chicago Tribune opined, “The Associated Press would 
do itself and the principle of a free press infinite harm and 
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seriously delay a free world if it became any part of the power 
politics of the State Department…”31 American journalism 
was thus divided over whether the government should be 
engaged in international news distribution at all and if so, 
whether commercial news organizations should be involved 
in the undertaking. It was a disagreement that would not 
soon end.
Two months later, Benton addressed a meeting of the 
New York Newspaper Woman’s Club with a speech focused 
on what he considered the responsibilities of the Associated 
Press in the postwar world. He categorized the news 
agency’s objections as “fear of a propaganda label, fear 
of government, fear of competition, and fear of the sales 
ability of other services.”32 He concluded by asking, “Where 
the alternatives are, on the one hand, the greatest threat 
to mass obliteration the world has ever known, and on the 
other the necessity for the greatest and quickest spread of 
understanding among the peoples of the world that has ever 
been attempted, can this action be called living up to the 
responsibility of a free press in the postwar world?”33
The assistant secretary’s presentation summarized many 
themes that had appeared in preceding debates about 
peacetime government broadcasting, including concern 
about the government’s engagement in propaganda and 
worry that the government would be competing with 
the nation’s broadcast industry at home and abroad. In 
chastising the news agencies, Benton was pointing to what 
he saw as an ironic contradiction between the positions of 
individuals and institutions in the press who were staunch 
supporters of global information freedom in the postwar 
environment—the highest profile of whom was perhaps 
Kent Cooper of the Associated Press34—but who also stood 
in strident opposition to establishment of a government-
driven mechanism intended to help promote those very 
goals.
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When the American Society of Newspaper Editors 
(ASNE) convened its annual meeting that year, the 
group’s president, John S. Knight, spoke at length about 
his opposition to government-sponsored international 
broadcasting, saying, “I applaud Mr. Benton’s ardent desire 
to give the world more information about our country, but 
as yet I remain unconvinced that it can be accomplished 
through government publicity agencies.”35 Benton 
addressed the same crowd in hopes of winning converts to 
the government’s position but made little progress. When 
Editor & Publisher reported on his visit, it editorialized with 
a statement expressing hope that Congress, which was 
watching these exchanges carefully, would not interpret 
ASNE’s support for the wire services’ position as opposition 
to the very prospect of a peacetime government-sponsored 
international information program. Editor & Publisher 
suggested this interpretation of the situation was a legitimate 
concern since “[a]fter all, the congressmen were debating 
proposals to set up a government information program at the 
same time newspaper editors were labeling it propaganda.”36
Finding the nation’s journalists difficult interlocutors, 
Benton turned his attention to courting support from 
Congress for the international broadcasting plan. He began 
by convening a committee of sympathetic leaders from the 
media industry to strategize with the Department about how 
to move forward. Among the group’s members were Roy 
E. Larsen, president of Time Inc.; Edward R. Murrow, vice 
president of CBS; and Harold Lasswell from the Yale School 
of Law. The New York Times described the committee’s task 
as one of appraising Voice of America’s content.37 In a House 
hearing dedicated to consideration of the broadcaster, 
Ralph McGill of The Atlanta Constitution editorialized about 
the position of the news agencies, saying that although 
he was personally fond of the leaders of the AP and other 
organizations, he doubted that “God had appointed them 
to protect the freedom of the press.”38 Mark Ethridge, editor 
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of The Louisville Courier-Journal and Times and one-time 
president of the National Association of Broadcasters, said 
he too found the wire services to be “exceedingly smug in 
the idea that they are the possessors of all the purity.”39 These 
comments demonstrated that earlier disagreements about 
the administration’s proposal for peacetime international 
broadcasting were likely to follow Benton as he pivoted 
toward rallying support on the Hill.
Despite a period of steady media attention to the public 
sparring between the administration and the press, by the 
end of 1946 Editor & Publisher declared the disagreement 
over,40 with industry opinion coalescing around 
recognition of the need for the government to engage in 
peacetime international broadcasting after all. The issue of 
noncooperation from the wire services receded into the 
background. But the legislation still faced a few hurdles 
before its passage a year later. Between late 1946 and the 
bill’s approval in early 1948, Benton quit, and Congress 
moved to cut the funding that had been keeping the Voice 
of America afloat since the end of the war.41 The New York 
Times summarized the situation that had driven Congress to 
take this action, writing that “the program has been assailed 
in this country on various grounds; that it is an expensive 
luxury, that it competes with private enterprise, that it is 
ineffective, that there are ‘Reds’ in its… staff.”42
Justifying its decision to cut funding, the House 
Appropriations Committee declared its belief that the 
government should not be involved in the news business.43 
Funding to continue broadcasts was cobbled together, 
but other skirmishes continued during this period: some 
focused on funding; others concerned lingering questions 
about the propriety of government engagement in news 
production and dissemination; and still others tied to fears 
that the State Department was infested with communists 
whose views might contaminate the broadcasts themselves. 
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Representative John Tabor (R-NY) summarized the sentiment 
of many on the Hill when he said he would contemplate 
funding for U.S. international broadcasting if the “drones, 
loafers and incompetents” were removed from the 
Department.44 For the Truman Administration, Congress was 
proving as treacherous a minefield as the press had been. As 
one early study of Smith-Mundt described the discussions, 
opposition to the bill “was often concerned with the basic 
problems of government-industry relationships which 
underlay so many discussions in the post-war period.”45 
Representative Karl Mundt (R-SD), House sponsor of the 
bill that eventually succeeded, once mused, “Never since 
I have been in Congress have I heard such a disorganized 
collection of misinformation circulated about any one piece 
of legislation.”46
Ultimately, it was widespread worry about the growing 
global communist threat that cut through the concerns 
and provided the momentum necessary to push the long-
languishing legislation over the finish line. There was 
particular alarm about how the Soviet Union was portraying 
the United States to audiences across Europe. Intensity 
of concern peaked following the overseas activities of a 
number of Congressional delegations that were engaged in 
fact-finding missions on the war-battered continent toward 
the end of 1947. As the delegations visited major European 
capitals, The Washington Post referred to the expeditions as 
“the greatest legislative exploration in history.”47 The paper 
noted that upon his return from a fact-finding mission to 
Europe, the formerly isolationist Mundt had expressed a 
newfound commitment to internationalism. Returning to 
the United States, he had expressed alarm that “…in every 
country we visited… we are losing this war of words.”48 As 
the traveling politicians made their way back to Washington 
in late 1947, the Post observed that “[a]lmost without 
exception, members of Congress who toured Europe… have 
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come back convinced of the necessity for expanding our 
international information program.”49 
Calling on Congress to take immediate action on the 
international information front, The Washington Post also 
cautioned against using the same propagandistic approach 
employed by the Soviet Union as it spread misinformation in 
support of a single ideology. By resisting this temptation, the 
newspaper counseled, the United States would succeed in 
avoiding the perils of propaganda. “The objective truth,” the 
Post noted, “can be just as devastating as Moscow’s name-
calling, and far more effective.”50 At the end of 1947, The 
New York Times declared that prospects for passage of the 
legislation were good, aided as they were by a rapid decline in 
relations with the Soviet Union, Russia’s concurrent increase 
in anti-American propaganda and new Congressional 
awareness of the need to counter Soviet activity.51
Adding a sense of urgency was a December report from 
the National Security Council (NSC) declaring, “The USSR 
is conducting an intensive propaganda campaign directed 
primarily against the US and is employing coordinated 
psychological, political and economic measures designed 
to undermine non-Communist elements in all countries. 
The ultimate objective of this campaign is not merely to 
undermine the prestige of the US and the effectiveness of 
its national policy but to weaken and divide world opinion 
to a point where effective opposition to Soviet designs is no 
longer attainable by political, economic or military means.”52 
The NSC memo concluded, “The present world situation 
requires the immediate strengthening and coordination of 
all foreign information measures of the US Government 
designed to influence attitudes in foreign countries in a 
direction favorable to the attainment of its objectives and to 
counteract effects of anti-US propaganda.”53 The document 
indicated it was appropriate for the Secretary of State to be 
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tasked with coordination and implementation of government 
efforts to address foreign disinformation campaigns.54
With all this as backdrop, the Smith-Mundt Act was 
finally passed in January 1948.55 Upon President Truman’s 
signing of the bill, The Washington Post called the country’s 
newly-approved international outreach efforts “virtually 
the only means of explaining American policies to peoples 
behind the so-called ‘Iron Curtain’”,56 and it described the 
bill’s success as “recognition of the significance of the 
battle of ideologies in which we are engaged.”57 Later that 
year, CQ Almanac described the Act’s purposes as two-
fold. The first “is an information service stemming from the 
Office of War Information’s foreign activities and including 
the radio ‘Voice of America’… The other is an exchange of 
students, teachers, and technical consultants between the 
United States and foreign countries… Both aim to promote 
better understanding of the United States and strengthen 
international relations.”58
The new law stated that in order for the country to promote 
improved understanding of the United States abroad, the 
government was authorized to, in addition to establishing 
international exchanges, “provide for the preparation, and 
dissemination abroad, of information about the United 
States…”59 Concerning the dissemination of any such 
content within the country’s borders, the statute mandated 
that the content “be available, in the English language at 
the Department of State, at all reasonable times following 
its dissemination abroad, for examination by representatives 
of the United States press associations, newspapers, 
magazines, radio systems, and, on request, shall be made 
available to Members of Congress.”60 As stand-ins for the 
American public, media organizations would have access to 
the broadcast content in ways the rest of the public could 
not. Moreover, in clear acknowledgement of the commercial 
interests of the U.S. news industry, the bill instructed the 
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Secretary of State to “reduce such government information 
activities wherever corresponding private information 
dissemination is found to be adequate” and that nothing 
in the law should be construed to “give the Department a 
monopoly in the production or sponsorship on the air… or a 
monopoly in any other medium of information.”61
As passed, the Smith-Mundt Act suggested little concern 
on the part of Congress about the American public gaining 
access to the broadcaster’s content. More explicit emphasis 
was placed on preventing government competition with 
commercial news producers as they sought to expand 
abroad. Still, by declaring that media organizations were 
to act as conduits to the materials, the legislation placed 
hurdles in the path of any citizen who sought access to the 
government-produced content.
Considering the Ban
Twenty years after the bill’s passage, the congressionally 
mandated U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, led by 
Frank Stanton, president of CBS, observed that “what began as 
a caution has hardened into a policy” of preventing domestic 
access to content produced by the U.S. government.62 Noting 
that under the watchful eye of Congress and the media 
the government was constrained from propagandizing the 
public, the commission argued that it was time for “the walls” 
that barred domestic audiences from the content to “come 
down.”63 The group recommended that “the American public 
should no longer be prohibited from seeing and studying 
the product a government agency produces with public 
funds for overseas audiences. [Those]… who are interested 
in foreign affairs and international relations should not be 
denied access to what the U.S. government is saying about 
itself and the rest of the world.”64
SEVENTY YEARS OF THE SMITH-MUNDT ACT   21
This guidance to legislators was offered in 1967, but rather 
than freeing access to the materials, Congress instead took 
successive actions to further limit public access. First among 
the additional restrictions was an amendment included in 
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972.65 Referred 
to as the Fulbright Amendment, named after the powerful 
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the 
change mandated that “[a]ny such information [content 
produced by government-sponsored broadcasters]…
shall not be disseminated within the United States, its 
territories, or possessions, but, on request, shall be available 
in the English language at the Department of State, at all 
reasonable times…”66 The rationale for this change seems 
to have stemmed less from worry about the delivery of 
government propaganda to the American people and more 
from a personal disagreement between Senator J. William 
Fulbright (D-AR) and Bruce Herschensohn, an assistant 
administrator at the United States Information Agency (USIA), 
the government organization that had been created in 1953 
to manage American public diplomacy efforts.67
Fulbright had written to Acting Attorney General Richard 
Kleindienst in early 1972 expressing concern about New 
York television stations’ broadcast of a USIA-produced film 
titled Czechoslovakia 1968. The senator was concerned 
that presentation of the film in the United States had been a 
violation of the terms of the Smith-Mundt Act. When informed 
of the complaint, Herschensohn described Fulbright’s views 
as “naïve and stupid.”68 Herschensohn soon apologized 
and resigned, but Kleindienst nevertheless ruled that while 
Smith-Mundt prohibited direct dissemination of broadcast 
content by the government itself to the American public, 
media organizations did indeed have the right to circulate 
the materials.69 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
in turn, deemed Kleindienst’s interpretation of the law “a 
distortion of the legislative intent concerning the domestic 
distribution” of the government-produced materials.70 But 
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this was not before an exchange between Senator Fulbright 
and USIA’s director, Frank Shakespeare, that The New York 
Times described as “a verbal spitting match that has thrown 
into question the future of the United States information 
program overseas.”71
There was a history of bad blood between the director and 
the senator. Well before the hearing and the disagreement 
about domestic use of USIA-produced materials, 
Shakespeare was reported to have called Fulbright “bad 
news for America.” Fulbright, in turn, allegedly responded 
that the director was a “very inadequate man” for the job.72 
As it considered the matter of domestic dissemination of 
USIA-produced materials, the Senate committee moved to 
impose what it described as a “blanket prohibition” on the 
content, ensuring that the materials in question could only 
be distributed in the United States with authorization by 
Congress.73 With the amendment entering into force soon 
thereafter, explicit restrictions on domestic access to the 
government-produced content were born.
More than a decade later, Senator Edward Zorinsky (D-NE) 
offered an amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorization 
Act for 1986 and 1987 mandating that “[n]o material prepared 
by the United States Information Agency shall be distributed 
within the United States.”74 In discussing his proposal on the 
floor of the Senate, Zorinsky observed that restrictions on the 
government’s ability to propagandize the American public 
were what distinguished the United States from the Soviet 
Union. He noted further that while USIA’s first mandate was 
to tell the world about the United States, its second mandate 
was to tell the United States about the world,75 and he warned 
that “[t]here is considerable discussion within USIA about 
using the Agency’s so-called second mandate to engage in 
domestic propaganda.” Not only had that second mandate 
never been implemented, Zorinsky argued, it never should 
be. He concluded his remarks by declaring, “The American 
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taxpayer certainly does not need or want his tax dollars used 
to support U.S. Government propaganda directed at him 
or her. My amendment ensures that this will not occur.”76 
The amendment passed.77 One contemporary author has 
described its passage and the restrictions it imposed as the 
“zenith of the domestic dissemination ban.”78
Testing the Ban
No further restrictions were ever imposed, although 
almost thirty years elapsed before the ban was eliminated.79 
The legislation that ended the ban, the Smith-Mundt 
Modernization Act of 2012,80 is discussed in further detail 
in coming pages, but before its passage came other 
developments with implications for public access to 
government-produced materials intended for foreign 
publics. There were also significant changes to the 
organizational structure responsible for directing the creation 
and distribution of the government-sponsored content. 
They are considered here because contemporary concerns 
about the management of U.S. international broadcasting 
are increasingly intertwined with broader debates about the 
efficacy of American government messaging abroad, the 
possibility of government propaganda in the homeland and 
overall return on investment for U.S. taxpayer dollars. As the 
discussion below helps demonstrate, current debates are 
rooted in decades of congressional, judicial and journalistic 
actions.
A year after passage of the Zorinsky Amendment, Michael 
Gartner, the president of NBC News,81 co-owner of The 
Ames (Iowa) Tribune and eventual winner of a Pulitzer Prize 
for editorial writing,82 published a commentary in The Wall 
Street Journal reflecting on what he saw as the absurdity 
of the domestic dissemination ban. He observed that it had 
“been the law since at least 1972, maybe since 1967 and 
perhaps since 1948, depending on who is interpreting the 
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U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 
and its subsequent alterations. It’s the view of the United 
States Information Agency, the parent of the Voice, that the 
prohibition on the American press has existed since 1948.”83 
Highlighting the fact that it was only because he was a 
journalist that he was able to gain access to archives at the 
Voice of America headquarters in Washington, he wrote, 
“The people at the Voice, who are awfully nice, wouldn’t give 
me a transcript and wouldn’t let me make a copy. And even 
if I had a copy, I couldn’t share it with you. It’s against the law 
for me to tell you.”84 Sufficiently annoyed by the situation, 
Gartner, along with a state legislator, and the Tribune itself, 
went on to file a lawsuit against USIA claiming that their first 
amendment rights were violated by the ban. But the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of Iowa dismissed 
the case, finding that “[p]laintiffs have not demonstrated a 
concrete injury or controversy as to their ability to speak, 
and they have no constitutional right to make verbatim 
copies of the agency’s documents at the agency’s offices.”85
Although not allowing the case to proceed, the judge did 
note “It would be easy to conclude that USIA’s position is 
inappropriate or even stupid.”86 Writing another Wall Street 
Journal commentary a year after the first—and after USIA had 
appeared to adjust its rules for public access to materials—
Gartner declared that the agency’s previous interpretation 
of the law had been “…censorship. It was outrageous. And 
it was stupid.” The problem had been, he argued, that “an 
agency in the information business was not being allowed 
to inform.” Gartner argued that his lawsuit had not been a 
true failure because in materials USIA had prepared for the 
court, the agency seemed to have decided to relax its rules 
about access and dissemination, determining that the ban 
applied only to the agency itself and not to other people who 
gained access to the materials. USIA had also indicated that 
it would not vet the credentials of anyone seeking to review 
the broadcast content; that is, one no longer needed to be 
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a journalist or member of Congress to access materials at 
the agency’s headquarters. Finally, USIA had determined that 
those who viewed agency-produced materials could take 
copious notes, and, although those notes were not to be 
verbatim, there would be no check to ensure compliance.87 
Referring to the changes and to what he viewed as the 
improved prospects for American democracy as a result, 
he closed his commentary with a simple sentiment: “I feel 
pretty good about it.”88
Two years after Gartner’s second piece in The Wall 
Street Journal, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for 
1991 and 1992 included language to allow the American 
public access to materials produced by the U.S. Information 
Agency after twelve years. The amendment to Smith-Mundt 
instructed the director of USIA to “make available to the 
Archivist of the United States, for domestic distribution” 
any materials prepared by the agency after more than a 
decade had passed.89 The change offered an opportunity 
for citizens to eventually review the content, but it also 
sidestepped concerns about the possibility that USIA would 
seek to influence the American public in real time.90 The 
amendment passed without comment in major American 
papers. Based on Gartner’s and his attorney’s interpretation 
of USIA’s changed practices in 1989 as spelled out in the 
former’s commentary, the change in the statute seems to 
have merely codified policies that were already in place.
The U.S. International Broadcasting Act of 1994, part of 
the Foreign Relations and Authorization Act for 1994 and 
1995, was the next legislative action with implications for 
U.S. international broadcasting and related activities, but 
this time, the changes were focused on the organizational 
structure responsible for overseeing these efforts. The 
opening section of the bill contained language reminiscent 
of the early days after World War II, declaring, “It is the 
policy of the United States to promote the right of freedom 
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of opinion and expression, including the freedom ‘to seek, 
receive, and impart information and ideas through any 
media and regardless of frontiers,’ in accordance with… the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”91 Such language 
would have been familiar to Kent Cooper and others who 
had been passionate advocates for information freedom at 
the end of the war.
The bill included an amendment to earlier legislation 
stating that no monies appropriated to USIA could be used 
to influence public opinion in the United States and that 
no materials produced by the agency could be circulated 
domestically. It clarified, however, that “[t]he provisions of 
this [law] shall not prohibit the United States Information 
Agency from responding to inquiries from members of the 
public about its operations, policies, or programs.”92 This 
meant that although content produced by broadcasters 
could not be circulated to the American public for twelve 
years, the government organization was nevertheless 
expected to be transparent about its work. The language 
addressing this issue appeared under the header “Ban on 
Domestic Activities by the USIA”.93
More importantly, for contemporary discussions about 
U.S. information diplomacy activities, the International 
Broadcasting Act of 1994 created the Broadcasting Board 
of Governors (BBG) within USIA to work toward “achiev[ing] 
important economies and strengthen[ing] the capability 
of the United States to use broadcasting to support 
freedom and democracy in a rapidly changing international 
environment.”94 Among the standards and principles that the 
BBG was directed to embrace was the expectation that all 
broadcast content produced under its purview be consistent 
with U.S. foreign policy objectives, that it not duplicate the 
work of private U.S. broadcasters and that it maintain the 
highest journalistic standards.95 This language, too, had 
echoes of decades past.
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While USIA’s tweaked interpretation of obligations under 
the Smith-Mundt Act in response to the Gartner case in 
the late 1980s may have offered some hope to those who 
sought easier access to content produced by government-
sponsored broadcasters, a decision handed down by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
a decade later ruled that content produced by USIA, 
specifically programming materials and internet addresses 
related to its broadcasts, was exempt from the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA).96 The appellants in the case, Essential 
Information, Inc., described themselves as “researchers, 
scholars, organizers and journalists”, and the court denied 
their request for access to data from USIA, citing the blanket 
prohibition on domestic dissemination contained in the 
Smith-Mundt Act. Pointing to a history of legislative attention 
to issues related to distribution of government-produced 
content in the United States, the court ruled that “Congress 
has expressed its concern plainly in the Smith-Mundt Act and 
we must therefore” comply with those terms.97 Remarkably, 
the fact that government-sponsored materials produced 
for and distributed to foreign audiences around the globe 
had been deemed beyond the reach of FOIA seems to have 
escaped the notice of major media American media outlets, 
although the Associated Press had reported on the case 
when it was first filed in 1996.98
The same year as the court’s FOIA decision, the Foreign 
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act dissolved the U.S. 
Information Agency and moved all of its activities, except 
for international broadcasting, into the Department of State. 
The Broadcasting Board of Governors, created just four 
years earlier, was spun off as an independent agency to 
be overseen by a part-time bipartisan board.99 Despite this 
momentous change in the organizational structures tasked 
with implementing American public diplomacy, the statutes 
governing production and dissemination of broadcast 
materials for foreign audiences remained unchanged. A 
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spokesman for Senator Jesse Helms, chair of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee and chief proponent of the 
move to eliminate USIA, framed the legislation as “slimming 
down the bureaucracy” and “bringing more coherence to 
foreign affairs institutions.”100 But coherence was not among 
the outcomes generated by establishment of an independent 
Broadcasting Board of Governors. The structure of the BBG 
was not meaningfully addressed until 2017, a development 
that will be discussed in more detail later. First, however, 
attention returns to the ban on domestic dissemination of 
government-sponsored broadcast and related information 
materials.
Ending the Ban
The domestic dissemination ban remained in place until 
passage of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 
for fiscal year 2013. Embedded within that legislation was 
the Smith-Mundt Modernization Act of 2012. The language 
implementing the change was straightforward: “Information 
intended for foreign audiences may, upon request and 
reimbursement of the reasonable costs incurred in fulfilling 
such a request, be made available, in the United States.”101
Rationale for the change was clear in comments offered 
by one of the bill’s sponsors. When it was first introduced 
in 2010, Representative William H. “Mac” Thornberry (R-TX) 
commented, “The central problem is that the law [Smith-
Mundt] has not kept up with changes in technology. Whether 
it is the Internet, the most obvious example, or even satellite 
television broadcasts, it becomes extremely difficult to say 
this broadcast is not only intended for foreign audiences but 
will only go to foreign audiences.”102 Gartner’s commentary 
and unsuccessful lawsuit had comprised the first salvo, and 
the issue had emerged once more in 1996 when journalists 
again commented on the domestic availability of USIA 
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content, but the Smith-Mundt Modernization Act finally 
addressed this cold war-era anachronism.103
With a single action, Congress removed the ban on 
domestic dissemination of materials that had taken almost 
seventy years to develop. Cautioning that the content 
in question was still not to be used for propagandizing 
the American public, the bill mandated that both the 
Broadcasting Board of Governors and the Department of 
State were prohibited “from engaging in any medium of 
communication, either directly or indirectly because a United 
States domestic audience is or may be thereby exposed 
to program material, or based on a presumption of such 
exposure.”104 The policy on accessing materials issued by the 
BBG in response to the bill’s passage was straightforward: “As 
directed by the National Defense Authorization Act for 2013 
and amendments to the U.S. Information and Educational 
Exchange Act, the Broadcasting Board of Governors issues 
a rule which establishes procedures for responding to 
domestic requests for the Agency’s program materials. The 
Agency may, upon request, provide members of the public, 
organizations, and media with program materials which the 
Agency disseminated abroad.”105
In the history of postwar U.S. international broadcasting, 
the volume of media coverage accompanying the end of 
the domestic dissemination ban has been matched only by 
the attention that journalists in the late 1940s dedicated to 
debates before passage of the original legislation. Most of 
the reporting and commentary about the end of the ban 
seemed to stem from a fundamental misunderstanding 
about the scope of the act itself. Many writers wrongly 
suggested that the law applied to content produced by 
all government agencies, not simply the broadcasters and 
Department of State. The danger, these writers argued, was 
that with the end of the ban, all U.S. government entities 
were free to propagandize the American public at will.
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BuzzFeed was first to raise the alarm in advance of the 
bill’s passage. A website that epitomizes the contemporary 
media ecosystem, it published an article about the proposed 
legislation that declared, “An amendment that would 
legalize the use of propaganda on American audiences is 
being inserted into the latest defense authorization bill…”106 
Politico soon followed suit, writing, “The new law would give 
sweeping powers to the State Department and Pentagon to 
push television, radio, newspaper, and social media onto the 
U.S. public.”107 Also weighing in on the subject, a reporter for 
The Christian Science Monitor tweeted, “What I want is to 
make it harder, not easier, to propagandize our citizens.”108 
And an academic with a widely read blog focused on 
foreign policy asserted that the legislation would “allow the 
Department of Defense to subject the U.S. domestic public 
to propaganda.”109
In response to the inaccurate coverage, Representative 
Thornberry observed that in an era of interactive media, 
the spread of misinformation about the legislation was 
“a fascinating case study in how one blogger was pretty 
sloppy, not understanding the issue and then it got picked 
up by [other outlets], and you had one level of sloppiness 
on top of another. And once something sensational gets 
out there, it just spreads like wildfire.”110 His statement 
echoed Representative Mundt’s lament issued decades 
earlier about the nature of public discourse surrounding the 
Smith-Mundt Act when he said “…never have I heard such a 
disorganized collection of misinformation circulated about 
any one piece of legislation.”111 Soon after introduction of 
the bill proposing an end to the ban, an article in Columbia 
Journalism Review addressed the panic, chastising journalists 
and commentators for the inaccuracies in their work. It 
concluded, “The proposed change to the Smith-Mundt Act 
will bring the law into the 21st century and give Americans 
access to the same content as audiences around the world. 
What took so long?”112 
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Addressing the Broadcasting Board of Governors
Almost ten years after the BBG emerged as a free-
standing entity responsible for management and oversight of 
the nation’s international broadcast efforts, an independent 
report described the organization’s structure as “an illogical 
patchwork, an archipelago of broadcasting organizations 
lacking clear individual missions and lacking a normal 
separation between management and oversight.”113 That 
report was just the first of many critical analyses focused 
on the BBG and the content produced by broadcast entities 
under its purview.114 Perhaps the most damning criticism, 
and certainly the most visible, came a decade later when 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, during a televised House 
Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, described the BBG as 
“practically defunct.”115 She was referring as much to the 
organization’s untenable organizational structure as she was 
to its apparent inability to keep pace with what scholars have 
referred to as a “global communications arms race”.116
Upon introduction of an amendment to the 2017 
National Defense Authorization Act addressing the BBG’s 
organizational structure, the amendment’s sponsor and chair 
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Representative 
Ed Royce (R-CA), noted that the American response to 
propaganda from Russia, China, ISIS and others “has been 
crippled, in part, by bureaucracy. Our agencies that helped 
take down the Iron Curtain with accurate and timely 
broadcasting have lost their edge. They must be revitalized to 
effectively carry out their mission in this age of viral terrorism 
and digital propaganda. My provision takes an important first 
step in this process by replacing the BBG’s part-time board 
with a permanent CEO to help better deliver real news to 
people in countries where free press does not exist.”117
In the context of U.S. international messaging efforts, the 
National Defense Authorization Act of 2017 tackled what 
32    SEVENTY YEARS OF THE SMITH-MUNDT ACT
had come to be widely regarded as “strategic dysfunction”118 
at the Broadcasting Board of Governors. When he signed 
the legislation, President Barack Obama issued a statement 
saying, “My Administration strongly supports the bill’s 
structural reform of the Broadcasting Board of Governors 
(BBG), which streamlines BBG operations and reduces 
inefficiencies…”119 The legislation disbanded the nine-
member part-time board that had been responsible for 
management of the BBG since its creation in 1994, and it 
put in place a single CEO commissioned to streamline 
the agency’s activities and seek efficiencies across the five 
broadcasters under its purview.
As with passage of the Smith-Mundt Modernization Act a 
few years earlier, criticisms of the change came in the form 
of alarmist declarations from major American media outlets 
and online commentators: “Trump to Inherit State-Run TV 
Network with Expanded Reach”,120 “Don’t Gut America’s 
Voice and Turn It into Propaganda”,121 “Trump TV Could 
Really Be a Thing… and on the Government’s Dime”122 and 
“A Big Change to U.S. International Broadcasting—and It’s 
One Putin Might Admire.”123 The over-the-top coverage 
often neglected to mention longstanding concerns about 
the management structure at the BBG, ongoing worries 
about the efficacy of the products produced by the agency, 
the need for anyone appointed to the new CEO position to 
receive Senate approval or the fact that efforts to reform 
the organization had widespread bipartisan support in the 
House and Senate and were embraced by the Obama White 
House.
Sidestepping the Broadcasters?
As discussed above, one section of the NDAA sought 
to begin imposing order on an organizational structure 
widely recognized to be deeply flawed. But a separate 
section of that same legislation also tackled the challenge 
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of communicating with foreign publics. The Countering 
Disinformation and Propaganda Act authorized the 
Global Engagement Center (GEC), an effort that had been 
established by President Obama earlier the same year.124 
The bill instructed the Center to “lead, synchronize, and 
coordinate efforts of the Federal Government to recognize, 
understand, expose, and counter foreign state and non-
state propaganda and disinformation efforts aimed at 
undermining United States national security interests.”125 A 
Congressional Research Service memorandum about the 
legislation interpreted the bill’s language to mean Congress 
had authorized a mandate for the Center beyond that initially 
specified by the executive order to include a “much broader 
purpose for the new GEC than the original one, possibly 
encompassing counterterrorism communications but also 
expanding the GEC’s coverage to include countering certain 
foreign communications from any source.”126
The expanded mandate appears to allow the possibility 
of overlap with the mission of U.S. international broadcasting 
as understood for the last seventy years. It also suggests that 
Congress may have been hedging its bets when it tackled 
government-sponsored messaging efforts in the NDAA. 
Congress attempted to begin untangling the “illogical 
patchwork” at the Broadcasting Board of Governors, 
but in hopes of helping to ensure effective government 
performance in the delivery of messages to foreign 
audiences, it seems to have given expanded authority to an 
entirely separate entity to undertake some of the same work.
Similar to the early days of U.S. international broadcasting 
before passage of Smith-Mundt, the Global Engagement 
Center has struggled for operational funds. But this time, 
the impediment to funding has been the State Department 
itself, where the statute mandates the Center be located. 
Senators Chris Murphy (D-CT) and Rob Portman (R-OH), 
cosponsors of the act, described as “indefensible”127 that as 
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reported by Politico,128 the Department of State under the 
Trump Administration had yet to request funds Congress had 
already appropriated to operate the Center. The senators’ 
joint statement declared, “Congress has provided substantial 
resources to combat foreign propaganda…There is broad 
agreement that the U.S. Government is behind the curve 
on this threat.”129 Although not mentioning the BBG and its 
broadcasters directly, the statement alluded to the previously 
discussed weaknesses in U.S. government-sponsored 
messaging efforts amidst what scholars have referred to 
as a “global communications arms race”.130 Then, in early 
2018, an editorial in The Washington Post attacked the 
Trump Administration for failing to act in the face of Russia’s 
disinformation threat at home and abroad,131 while minority 
members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee issued 
a report that condemned a “lack of urgency and self-imposed 
restraints by the current State Department leadership” for 
having left the Center in “limbo”.132
Back to the Future?
Seventy years after passage of the Smith-Mundt Act and 
nearly thirty years after the end of the Cold War, the United 
States once again finds itself in the midst of an international 
messaging crisis. Longstanding implements in the country’s 
public diplomacy tool box are enfeebled by lingering 
bureaucratic challenges,133 while newer organizations 
intended to be nimbler in today’s fast-moving international 
information ecosystem are falling victim to an administration 
that has yet to find its footing in the foreign policy realm. 
And Russia’s disinformation efforts once again form the core 
of the narrative about the need for the United States to get 
the message and delivery tools right.
Confirmation hearings for the Trump Administration’s 
nominee for Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy 
and Public Affairs, Steven Goldstein, took place near the end 
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of 2017. Senators asked Goldstein to commit to effective 
government messaging efforts. A statement released by 
Senator Portman’s office following the hearing reported 
that Goldstein had vowed to “work to ensure that the State 
Department’s Global Engagement Center (GEC) is both 
funded properly and works, as intended, to effectively 
counter foreign disinformation and propaganda.” He was 
approved by the Senate and sworn in the next month.134
Meanwhile, although Congress has taken the steps noted 
earlier to address well-recognized problems with the BBG, 
The Wall Street Journal complained in early 2018 that “[t]
he U.S. government seems remarkably slow and backward 
[in its messaging efforts], starting with the taxpayer-
backed Broadcasting Board of Governors.”135 The editorial, 
written in the face of seeming inaction on the part of the 
U.S. government in response to recent protests in Iran, 
condemned the BBG for dedicating less than 2 percent of 
its 2017 budget to efforts to promoting internet freedom. 
Criticizing the current CEO, a holdover from the Obama 
Administration, the editorial called the BBG’s board “a political 
sinecure, rather than a home for foreign-policy experts who 
want to fight oppression”136 and asked if President Trump 
was “aware that he could dismiss the BBG’s current board 
and nominate a CEO who’s more attuned to foreign policy 
and the fight for freedom?”137
Not unlike the immediate postwar era, contemporary 
discussions about U.S. international broadcasting and 
other messaging efforts directed at foreign publics are 
increasingly framed as more than attempts to build goodwill 
abroad. Indeed, one recent report called public diplomacy 
“as important to winning 21st-century conflicts as military 
might.”138 Appealing for a reimagined mission for U.S. 
international broadcasting and other messaging tools, that 
report’s authors asserted, “The need is growing to transmit 
truthful information into societies whose governments 
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are increasingly adept at filtering and obfuscating such 
information on the internet.”139 The question for today’s 
leaders, legislators, scholars and journalists is whether and 
how the United States is equipped to fight the information 
battles raging currently. At this moment in time, the question 
is not necessarily one of whether foreign audiences want 
to hear the American message as John S. Knight once 
asked, but as a growing number of critics worry, whether 
those foreign audiences are actually receiving the American 
message at all.140
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